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Introduction 
 
This working paper is the fourth in a series run by the ESRC/DFID funded project 
‘Poverty Alleviation in the Wake of Typhoon Yolanda’2. This project monitors the 
effectiveness of the Typhoon Yolanda relief efforts in the Philippines in relation to 
building sustainable routes out of poverty. The project focuses on urban population 
risk, vulnerability to disasters and resilience in the aftermath of shocks such as 
Typhoon Yolanda. The key themes of the project are vulnerability, risk and resilience 
in relation to disasters and pathways in and out of poverty. Our work investigates 
post-disaster reconstruction efforts, specifically within densely populated coastal 
urban areas. These communities are amongst the most at risk and yet least able to 
resurrect themselves after disasters. Impoverished communities are often constructed 
in hazardous locations that are vulnerable to disasters. The poor are exposed to a 																																																								1	Authors can be contacted as follows: Pauline Eadie, Pauline.Eadie@nottingham.ac.uk; Clarence 
Galang clarencegalang@ymail.com; Donabel Tumandao, beltumandao@gmail.com   
2 (Ref ES/M008932/1).   
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greater degree of environmental exposure than the rich and ‘poor people are 
experiencing more disasters than non-poor people’3. A lack of land and resources, in 
states with varying degrees of wealth, dictates that the poor are most often located 
wherever they can find security of tenure, no matter how tenuous this might be, and 
where they can access material and social resources. Those living in coastal zones or 
other flood prone areas are most at risk from any climate-change induced severity 
such as storms or other extreme weather events. 
 
Super-typhoon Yolanda4 (international name Haiyan) hit the Visayas region of the 
Philippines on 8 November 2013. Yolanda was one of the strongest typhoons ever to 
make landfall. Wind speeds reached in excess of 300 km/h and the associated storm 
surge reached over five meters in places5. Official figures show that 6,293 individuals 
were reported dead, 1,061 went missing and 28,689 were injured. The Visayas region 
of the Philippines was totally ravaged by the storm and the damage to infrastructure is 
estimated at 17 billion PHP (US$342,990,980) 6 . The typhoon affected 591 
municipalities and the total damage is estimated at US$904,680,0007. 93 percent of 
recorded deaths came from the Eastern Visayas (Region III)8. The total number of 
people affected by this disaster in terms of housing and infrastructure, livelihood, 
environmental and food security was approximately 16 million. 
 
More than three years after Typhoon Yolanda rehabilitation efforts are still ongoing. 
An estimated 518,878 houses suffered total damage, 493,912 suffered partial damage 																																																								3	Kim,	Namsuk	 (2012)	 ‘How	much	more	exposed	are	 the	poor	 to	natural	disasters?	Global	 and	regional	measurement’,	Disasters,	Vol.	36,	No.	2,	pps.	195-211,	p.	203.		
4 Eadie, Pauline (2013) ‘Typhoon in Philippines Reveals Underlying Political Failings’, Ballots and 
Bullets, 12 November. Available at: http://nottspolitics.org/2013/11/12/typhoon-in-philippines-reveals-
underlyingpolitical-failings/. Accessed 5 June 2016 5	For	storm	surge	levels	see:	Lagmay,	Alfredo	M.	F.	(2014)	‘Devastating	Storm	Surges	of	Typhoon	Yolanda’,	 Nationwide	 Operational	 Assessment	 of	 Hazards	 (NOAH)’,	 Quezon	 City.	 Available	 at:	http://blog.noah.dost.gov.ph/2014/06/02/devastating-storm-surges-of-typhoon-yolanda/.	Accessed	12	January	2017.	6 	National	 Economic	 and	 Development	 Authority,	 Republic	 of	 the	 Philippines	 (2015)	 ‘In	Numbers:	 2	 Years	 After	 Yolanda’,	 Pasig	 City.	 Available	 at:	 http://yolanda.neda.gov.ph/in-numbers-2-years-after-typhoon-yolanda/.	Accessed	10	January	2017.		
7 National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council, Republic of the Philippines, SitRep No. 
108 Effects of Typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan), 3 April 2014. Available at: 
http://www.ndrrmc.gov.ph/attachments/article/1329/Effects_of_Typhoon_YOLANDA_(HAIYAN)_Si
tRep_No_108_03APR2014.pdf. Accessed 5 June 2016. 8	National	 Risk	 Reduction	 and	 Management	 Council,	 Republic	 of	 the	 Philippines	 (n.d.)	 ‘Final	Report	 re	 Effects	 of	 Typhoon	 Yolanda	 (Haiyan)’,	 Quezon	 City.	 Available	 at:	http://ndrrmc.gov.ph/attachments/article/1329/FINAL_REPORT_re_Effects_of_Typhoon_YOLANDA_(HAIYAN)_06-09NOV2013.pdf.	Accessed	10	January	2017.		
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and nearly six million people lost their livelihood9. The practical objective of our 
project is to assess twenty typhoon-affected urban barangays10 across three Local 
Government Units (LGUs) in Region III in order to determine how and why poverty 
relief strategies work better or worse in different administrative units under similar 
post-disaster conditions over time. 17 of the barangays that were selected for this 
project are on the coast and therefore most at risk from typhoons. The remaining three 
barangays were relatively less affected as they are inland and/or on higher ground. 
These barangays serve as least affected controls however no barangays in the region 
were unaffected. All suffered a significant degree of damage, even if they were not 
affected by coastal flooding.      
 
Without ‘community participation, disaster relief often inadvertently rebuilds […] 
structures of vulnerability’11 consequently this paper is based on the premise that local 
communities should be tapped for information that will support resilient and 
sustainable disaster relief strategies. ‘Top down’ donor driven strategies may fail to 
account for local socio-economic and environmental realities. This may lead to 
erroneous assumptions about local beliefs and values and how power and allegiance 
operate in local communities. These issues are of key importance as they dictate how 
people behave and why they cooperate or come into conflict. Local configurations of 
power can control or distort information gathering and in turn the distribution of 
goods and services.  
 
Rehabilitation strategies that are informed by the survivors and self-assessment of 
their needs are desirable as solutions can then be devised that are context specific and 
hopefully more likely to be resilient in the longer term. However family and 
community based self-rated deprivation presents a number of challenges that are 
amplified in a post-disaster environment.  This paper argues that whilst ‘bottom up’ 
driven disaster relief strategies have their merits; they also present a number of 																																																								9	National	Economic	and	Development	Authority	(2015),	op.cit.		10	The barangays are: Tacloban: Barangays 54, 54-A, 66-A, 67, 87, 88, 89, and Abucay (least affected); 
Palo: Cavite, Cogon, Libertad (least affected), Pawing, Salvacion, and San Joaquin; and Tanauan: 
Bislig, Calogcog, Salvador (least affected), San Roque, Sta. Cruz, and Sto. Niño.  	11	Bhatt,	 Mihir	 R.	 and	 Reynolds,	 Tommy	 (2012)	 ‘Community-	 Based	 Disaster	 Risk	 Reduction:	Realizing	 the	 Primacy	 of	 Community’,	 in	 Emdad	 Haque,	 C.	 and	 Etkin,	 D.	 Disaster,	 Risk	 and	
Vulnerability:	 Mitigation	 through	 Mobilizing	 Communities	 and	 Partnerships,	 McGill-Queen’s	University	Press:	Montreal	and	Kingston,	pps.	71-90,	p.	74.			
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challenges. These challenges include conflict over resources, the likelihood that those 
with political power at the local level are likely to promote the preservation of the 
status quo and tension between immediate needs/survival and the long-term 
sustainability of rehabilitation programs. We argue that aid agencies need to engage 
with local communities to gather ‘good’ data for forward planning. However, as 
beneficiaries are likely to have the ‘expectation of reward or punishment’, data 
gathering is a somewhat challenging process.          
 
The aims of this paper are to examine the pros and cons of household interviews and 
examine the factors that impact upon the self-assessment of need. Disaster relief 
strategies that are based on flawed data are less likely to be cost effective and 
inequitable in terms of the allocation of goods or sustainable. Good data is important 
for disaster relief strategies including the effective development of local capacity 
building and preparedness for future disasters. Consequently it is important to be 
aware of the drawbacks of self-assessment, why skewed reporting might occur and 
what can be done to avoid, minimize and identify anomalies in the self-assessment of 
needs. This paper elaborates on a series of barangay (village) level interviews in 2015 
and 2016 conducted by the investigators of this project12 and five local researchers13. 
 
The first section of this paper offers a brief assessment of context specific and bottom 
up driven relief strategies and examines the pitfalls of self-rated poverty. We examine 
the tensions between top-down and bottom-up disaster relief strategies and argue that 
both approaches can suffer from politicking, subjective assessment of needs and 
multiple pressures on the direction and organization of any given policy. The second 
section of this paper discusses the rational for conducting household interviews. We 
also elaborate on the logistics of conducting the interviews and the ethical issues that 
we considered in relation to this process. In the following section we outline barangay 
politics and the role of barangay captains in order to highlight how local political 
power can potentially distort the data gathering processes. In the final section we 
																																																								12	Thanks	 are	 due	 to	 the	 co-investigators	 of	 this	 project,	 Prof.	Maria	 Ela	 Atienza	 and	 Prof	May	Tan-Mullins,	 for	review	comments	on	this	paper.	The	primary	 investigator	of	 this	project	 is	Dr.	Pauline	Eadie,	co-author	of	this	paper.				13	We	 would	 like	 to	 acknowledge	 the	 contribution	 of	 Galang,	 Clarence;	 Gerona,	 Christer	 K.	 O;	Tumanadao,	 Donabel;	 Rojas,	 Theresia	 K.;	 Villones,	 Marvie	 to	 this	 research.	 Galang	 and	Tumanadao	are	co-authors	of	this	paper.		
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examine the issues and tensions that we experienced when conducting interviews with 
survivors. These tensions include contradictions in responses (even within the same 
interview); the presence of ‘uninvited’ friends and neighbours in interviews and the 
importance of anonymity. We offer a number of suggestions to ease control of the 
semi-structured interview process including the merits of interview by conversation 
and establishing a clear academic identity for the researcher. We also address 
anticipation of ‘reward or punishment’, the effect that this can have on the self-
assessment of needs and why such anticipation makes it problematic for outside 
agencies to build an adequate picture of need. In conclusion we argue that researchers 
should devise systematic cross checking strategies to counter exaggerated, politically 
motivated or contradictory self-assessment. Self-assessment alone can be critiqued for 
lacking scientific rigour. However the contradictions and distortions inherent within 
self-assessment can also illuminate the local social context and that also has value in 
terms of devising effective, context specific, bottom-up post disaster strategies. In 
conclusion we argue that household interviews based on self-assessment can be very 
valuable however they need to be understood within the socio-cultural and material 
environment in which they are held in order to be fully understood.    
 
Disaster, Context and Self-rated Poverty  
 
In order to create sustainable disaster relief solutions it is desirable for survivors to 
become active participants in disaster relief services as opposed to passive recipients 
of those services. More broadly sustainable development 14  and disaster relief 
practitioners15 now recognize the merits of bottom up approaches. Disaster relief and 
rehabilitation strategies should be context specific.  ‘One size fits all’ solutions driven 
from the top have been critiqued as unsustainable over the longer term, especially 
when the support mechanisms and funding from outside donor programs ends. In 
order to be durable over the longer term ‘context’ has to be understood politically, 																																																								14	See	 i.e.	 Fraser,	 Evan	D.	G.	 et.	 al.	 (2005)	 ‘Bottom	up	 and	Top	Down:	Analysis	 of	 participatory	processes	 for	 sustainability	 indicator	 identification	 as	 a	 pathway	 to	 community	 empowerment	and	sustainable	environmental	management’	Journal	of	Environmental	Management,	Vol.	78,	pps.	114-127;	 Power	 el.	 Al.	 (2002)	 ‘Operationalising	 bottom	 up	 learning	 in	 international	 NGOs:	barriers	and	alternatives’	Development	in	Practice,	Vol.	12,	Nos.	3	and	4,	pps.	272-284	.					15	See	i.e.	Osti,	Rabindra	(2004)	‘Forms	of	participation	and	agencies’	role	for	the	implementation	of	water-induced	disaster	management:	protecting	and	enhancing	the	poor’,	Disaster	Prevention	
and	Management:	an	international	journal,	Vol.	13,	No.	1.	pps	6-12.		
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socially and materially. However societies inevitably change after a disaster. As well 
as material loss disasters can affect ‘social norms, attitudes, trust, and reciprocity of 
people within communities’16. Consequently, the post-disaster ‘context’ is a moving 
target and resilience is not just about recreating the society that was destroyed or 
staying the same. Thus it is crucial that governmental and non-governmental agencies 
take account of the voices of the people themselves in order to understand context and 
the material and social criteria necessary for positive change and sustainable 
rehabilitation.    
 
Top-down solutions may fail for a number of reasons including time constrained 
project funding, competition from elsewhere over resources, political maneuvering 
and the need for governmental and non-governmental agencies to be seen to be doing 
‘something’. These issues may result in a preference for media friendly activities. 
Outside agencies may not be familiar with the socio-economic, ecological or political 
context of a locality and under emergency conditions it is easier to resort to standard 
operating procedures in order to save lives and meet immediate basic needs. 
Meanwhile bottom-up driven solutions may fail because they are inward looking, 
focused on the short-term, overly subjective and suffer from a lack of resources and 
coordination. There may also be a mindset amongst survivors that if aid is offered it 
should be taken, whether it is needed or not, when the opportunity presents itself as 
assistance may cease in the future. However, as we will detail later in this paper, 
political maneuvering takes place at the bottom as well as at the top.     
 
Relief agencies need data after major disasters so that sustainable solutions, that best 
serve the needs of survivors, can be devised. Good data is necessary so that ‘priorities 
can be set and enforced [as] gaps and duplication may have fatal consequences that 
are less excusable given the extraordinary generosity of the assistance from countries 
and individuals’17. Benchmark data such as census or barangay records may be 
readily available however such data can be quickly outdated or lost in disasters. A 
																																																								16	Fleming,	David	A.	(2014)	‘Trust	and	Reciprocity	in	the	Aftermath	of	Natural	Disasters’,	Vol.	50,	No.	11,	pps.	1482-1493,	p.	1482.			17	De	Ville	de	Goyet,	Claude,	(2008)	‘Information	Gaps	in	Relief,	Recovery,	and	Reconstruction	in	the	Aftermath	 if	Natural	Disasters’	 in	Amin,	Samir	and	Goldstein,	Markus	P.	 (eds.)	Data	Against	
Natural	 Disasters:	 Establishing	 Effective	 Systems	 for	 Relief,	 Recovery	 and	 Reconstruction,	 The	World	Bank:	Washington,	pps.	23-58,	p.	34.			
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number of the barangay captains that were interviewed for this project complained 
that relief goods were distributed on the basis of the 2010 Philippine Census on 
Population and Housing. However, by 2013 the population had grown significantly 
meaning that the goods received were not enough for the barangay.  
 
Aid allocation may also suffer from arbitrary cut off points that designate survivors 
beyond that point as self-sufficient or in need of only limited assistance. The end 
result of such a cut off point is a false dichotomy between those survivors above and 
below the ‘poverty line’. Survivors may also fail to secure relief goods and services, 
as they are not recognized as qualified beneficiaries. In the aftermath of Yolanda 
government and aid agencies were heavily reliant on barangay captains to identify 
beneficiaries. This led to a number of disgruntled residents complaining that inclusion 
on the list was ‘colour-coded’, in other words dependent on political allegiance to the 
barangay captain. Further up the political chain of command local residents expressed 
the view that the allocation of aid to the barangays was also dependent on whether the 
barangay captain was politically allied with the mayor or not. Over the longer term 
skewed distribution of resources may lead to debt and impoverishment, as those 
deemed to be self-sufficient or ineligible have to find alternatives ways to self-fund 
their rehabilitation after a disaster.   
 
For disaster relief agencies attempting to generate robust data that can be used as a 
baseline for their programs it is problematic in that survey respondents may anticipate 
‘reward or punishment for any reply’18. Self-rated poverty in the aftermath of a 
disaster, under conditions when, sometimes significant aid flows are present, is 
problematic. Multiple agencies with overlapping objectives might approach survivors 
who may reach the stage of ‘survey fatigue’. If or when this stage is reached survivors 
are likely to fail to engage fully with the survey process, exaggerate their needs or 
accept types of aid that they don’t have a use for. Such responses will affect the 
efficiency of donor agencies as they may plan their strategies based on false or partial 
information. This problem is compounded as ‘the critical difference between the 
bottom-up and the top-down approaches to poverty measurement lies in whatever 
differences there may be between the (subjective) norms of the people at the bottom 																																																								18	Ibid,	p.	42.		
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and the (equally-subjective) norms of some people at the top’19 (original emphasis). In 
other words poverty alleviation and rehabilitation strategies suffer from a dual 
subjectivity from both the bottom and the top. In light of the critique of self-rated 
poverty outlined above the following section outlines the rationale and organization of 
our household interviews.  
 
Rationale and Conduct of Family Interviews 
 
Our questions were aimed at establishing the effect of Yolanda and the subsequent 
relief and rehabilitation efforts on household and community capacity. The objective 
of the Philippine government’s Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda (RAY): Build 
Back Better strategic plan was to ‘guide the recovery and reconstruction of the 
economy, lives and livelihoods in the affected areas [and] to restore the economic and 
social conditions of those areas at the very least to their pre-typhoon levels and to a 
higher level of disaster resilience’20. Information on the aims and objectives of policy 
makers and relief agencies was relatively easy to find. However it was less easy to get 
a systematic snapshot of the lived experience of survivors. 
 
In order to fill that gap we chose to conduct 4021 in-depth interviews with families 
across the 20 barangays that are the focus of this research. We identified two 
households in each barangay. In order to identify suitable families we approached the 
barangay captains who directed us to one most affected and one least affected family 
that were willing to be interviewed. By selecting 20 most affected and 20 least 
affected families we aimed to establish the factors that helped or hindered 
rehabilitation given their similar but perhaps different experiences. We asked every 
family the same questions. By interviewing 40 families in a semi-structured and 
systematic fashion we aimed to go beyond mere anecdotal evidence. However our 
questions were framed to allow for probing questions to also be asked. Respondents 
were specifically asked to give examples of any generalized claims that they made 
and to be a specific as possible about the types and sources of aid that they received. 																																																								19	Mangahas,	 Mahar	 (1995)	 ‘Self-rated	 Poverty	 in	 the	 Philippines,	 1991-1992,	 International	
Journal	of		Public	Opinion	Research,		Vol.	7,	No.	1,	pps.	40-55.		20	(n.	 a.)	 (2013)	Reconstruction	Assistance	on	Yolanda:	Build	Back	Better,	16	December,	National	Economic	and	Development	Authority	(NEDA):	Pasig	City,	p.	p.1.				21	40	follow	interviews	with,	as	far	as	possible,	the	same	families	will	be	conducted	in	July	2017.	
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We also interviewed each barangay captain annually for the duration of our project. 
Similar probing questions were used with the barangay captains. In both cases we 
took care to avoid giving suggestions to answers, unless it was to clarify the question. 
We also avoided ‘leading questions’ as we wanted to capture the point of view and 
lived experience of the respondent. We also took care to allow for silence as 
respondents thought about their replies, only breaking that silence to ensure that the 
respondent had understood the question. From the responses we gathered we were 
able to build a relatively comprehensive picture of capacity building strategies at the 
barangay level and the factors that that served to facilitate or undermine these 
strategies. 
 
We were particularly interested in testing whether the lived experience of survivors 
corroborated the claims that governmental and non-governmental agencies were 
making about the recovery efforts. If agencies were claiming success when in fact this 
was partial or non-existent it is important to identify this so that future practice can be 
improved. It is also important to identify issues that are significant to survivors, but 
might be missed by outside agencies that are guided by their own agendas so that 
these issues can be factored into future policy.  
 
We were also interested in assessing the extent to which survivors thought that 
communities pulled together in the aftermath of Yolanda and whether outside 
agencies facilitated community cohesion and in turn community resilience. This is 
because Building Back Better must promote fairness and equity and ‘recognize that 
families and communities drive their own recovery’22. Building Back Better is not just 
about material construction; it is about rebuilding communities, and who better to 
report on that than the people themselves. The household interview evidence has been 
cross-referenced with our survey results23, focus group discussions and governmental 
and non-governmental interviews. The picture that we have been able to build with 
our primary evidence has also been cross-referenced with primary and secondary 
																																																								22	Clinton,	 William	 J.	 (2006)	 Key	 Propositions	 for	 Building	 Back	 Better:	 Lessons	 Learned	 From	
Tsunami	Recovery,	Office	of	the	UN	Secretary	General’s	Special	Envoy	for	Tsunami	Recovery:	New	York,	 p.	 1.	Available	 at:	 http://www.preventionweb.net/files/2054_VL108301.pdf.	Accessed	25	January	2017.		23	800	 surveys	 were	 conducted	 each	 year	 for	 three	 years.	 2400	 in	 total	 across	 the	 selected	barangays.		
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evidence from other sources including agencies working in the same barangays in 
which we conducted interviews.   
 
The household interviews were conducted by young Filipino academics from 
University of the Philippines Visayas Tacloban College (UPVTC). This was a 
deliberate strategy aimed at minimizing calculations of reward or punishment24 that 
might have distorted responses. The interviewers were not foreign and they were 
clearly not from an aid agency or government office. They were also familiar with the 
local area and some of them were themselves, Yolanda survivors. All interviews were 
anonymous and the interviews were conducted in the local Waray dialect. The local 
language skills of the interviewers allowed the respondents to converse in the 
language they were most comfortable using. The questions asked allowed for open-
ended responses, this differed from the survey questions that worked on the basis of 
tick boxes that could be used to generate statistical data. Each family that we 
interviewed was given a food pack as a token of our appreciation for their assistance.  
 
Political Considerations 
 
Barangay councils are composed of a barangay captain and barangay kagawads or 
councilors. These elected officials act as village elders. They work with numerous 
outside agencies and deal with local disputes. As stipulated in Section 12 of RA 
10121, the barangay captain heads the Barangay Disaster Risk Reduction and 
Management Committee which is at the forefront of disaster risk reduction and 
recovery at the barangay level.25  Barangay captains played a crucial role in disaster 
preparation and recovery before and after Typhoon Yolanda.  
 
Barangay officials are normally elected for three-year terms. In 2013 barangay 
elections were held on 28 October, with the term of office starting on 30 November. 
This meant that officials were elected two weeks before Yolanda hit on 8 November 
and took office three weeks after. The 2016 election was suspended due to President 
Duterte’s fear that drug money would be used to ‘fund the campaigns of those 																																																								24	We	recruited	local	students	to	conduct	our	surveys	for	the	same	reason.		25	Republic	 of	 the	 Philippines	 (2010)	 Disaster	 Risk	 Reduction	 and	 Management	 Act	 of	 2010.	Available	at:		http://www.gov.ph/1991/10/10/republic-act-no-7160/.	Accessed	18	December	2016.		
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running for barangay posts’ 26. Duterte also wanted to press on with infrastructure 
projects and avoid the 45-day ban on public works and disbursement and expenditure 
of public funds before and after every election. This ban is in place so that 
unscrupulous officials can’t curry favour with the electorate by ensuring that much 
needed infrastructure projects coincide with the campaign period. The 2016 ban 
meant that the barangay officials in office during our project, notwithstanding some 
other reason for leaving their posts, were in their posts shortly after Yolanda hit the 
region in 2013. Frequently they were already serving as barangay captains or 
barangay council members during Yolanda so they were involved with the 
management of the community during the actual disaster.        
 
In the first year of our project we visited the captain of every barangay in the area 
under research. At that point we introduced ourselves, and the project, and conducted 
an initial interview. We also presented the captains with a certificate giving details of 
the universities and funders sponsoring the project and thanking them for their 
participation. These initial introductions were essential as the captains are in effect the 
gatekeepers to the community. It would have been difficult for subsequent interviews 
and surveys to be conducted in the barangay without first going through these 
formalities. In due course it was the barangay captains that we turned to in order to 
identify suitable families for our household interviews.  
   
However there were some setbacks to this approach. In the aftermath of Yolanda 
governmental and non-governmental aid agencies were heavily reliant on barangay 
captains for accurate data on the number of and needs of survivors. Barangay captains 
were tasked with listing qualified beneficiaries in relation to e.g. residence, 
dependents and age. Barangay captains wielded a significant degree of power over the 
allocation of resources. Many interviewees appeared reluctant to complain or openly 
criticize their barangay captains in order to avoid animosity that could potentially lead 
to them being struck off the beneficiary list27.  																																																								26	ABS-CBN	News	(2016)	 ‘Why	DILG	wants	barangay,	SK	polls	suspended’,	30	August.	Available	at:	 http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/08/30/16/why-dilg-wants-barangay-sk-polls-suspended.	Accessed	6	February	2016.	27	See	also	Sumagaysay.	Marietta,	et	al.	(2016)	'Promoting	Democratic	Accountability,	Providing	Permanent	 Housing	 to	 Survivors	 of	 Typhoon	 Haiyan	 in	 Palo',	 Leyte	 in	Building	Back	Better:	 A	
Democratic	Accountability	Assessment	of	Service	Delivery	After	Typhoon	Haiyan,	University	of	 the	Philippines	Center	for	Integrative	and	Development	Studies.	pps.	29-45.	
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The control over beneficiary lists is potentially an opportunity for patronage politics. 
Patronage can be defined as cash, goods or economic opportunities that are distributed 
in exchange for political support.28 Patronage is particularly evident before and after 
elections. Before elections patronage secures political support. After elections it 
rewards supporters and maintains loyalty. The relationship through which patronage 
is distributed is called clientelism29 , a known phenomenon in the Philippines. 
Therefore it is important to consider interviewee responses in the context of potential 
reward or punishment for political alignment or dissent. For this reason anonymity 
played a crucial role in the interview process. 
 
Some barangay captains recommended respondents who appeared to be political 
allies, even offering their barangay officials as respondents. Interviewees were quite 
open about their relationship to the barangay captain, which was based on either 
consanguinity or political affiliation. For example, in the selected barangays in 
Tanauan, one respondent was a brother of the barangay captain, one was the husband 
of the barangay secretary and one was the sister of a barangay health worker30. The 
relationship also became evident when these respondents were asked questions related 
to the barangay officials. Respondents would be profuse with their praise or dismiss 
the criticism of opponents. For example, some interviewees explained that the 
residents that complained about the ‘unfair’ allocation of resources were opponents of 
the barangay captain. These respondents dismissed complaints as ‘politically 
motivated’ allegedly aimed at tarnishing the image of the barangay captain.   
 
Many of the interviewees showed willingness to be interviewed and answered the 
questions freely, even sharing personal experiences not directly linked to the set 
interview questions. However, there were instances when respondents appeared 																																																								28	See	e.g.	Kerkvliet,	Benedict	J.	T.	(1995)	‘Toward	a	More	Comprehensive	Analysis	of	Philippine	Politics:	Beyond	 the	Patron-Client	Factional	Framework,	 Journal	of	Southeast	Asian	Studies,	Vol.	26,	No.	2,	pps.	401-419;	Quimpo,	Nathan	G.	(2005)	‘Oligarchic	Patrimonialism,	Bossism,	Electoral	Clientelism,	and	Contested	Democracy	in	the	Philippines’,	Comparative	Politics,	Vol.	37,	No.	2,	pps.	229-250.	29	See	Hicken.	Allen	(2011)	‘Clientelism’,	Annual	Review	of	Political	Science,	Vol.	14,	pps.	289-310.	30	However	 the	 line	 between	 community	 and	 family	 is	 a	 blurred	 line	 in	 many	 barangays	 as	commonly	 the	population	 is	 composed	of	many	extended	 families.	No	matter	who	we	chose	 to	interview	 or	 survey	 a	 blood	 tie	 was	 likely.	 This	 situation	 meant	 that	 it	 was	 hard	 to	 draw	 a	definitive	line	between	community	solidarity	and	family	ties	when	assessing	the	social	bonds	in	the	aftermath	of	Yolanda.		
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compelled to answer only because they were the ones assigned by the barangay 
captains. There were also instances when the respondents were hesitant in answering 
questions about the barangay officials for fear of offending them The respondents 
gave consent to record the interview, however when some questions about their 
barangay officials were asked, they became wary of answering freely as they feared 
that the recording might reach their barangay officials and might be used against 
them. When one respondent31 was asked about the allocation of resources, she 
became reluctant32 to respond to the question and argued: Bangin nim liwat ako ig-
sumat kan kapitan, ebidensya mo gud ini (You might report me to our barangay 
captain, this [recording] could be your evidence).  
 
An understanding of local power configurations is essential for aid agencies hoping to 
develop ‘bottom up’ driven rehabilitation strategies. The evidence that we gathered 
sometimes indicated an equitable and dynamic barangay captain. In other cases 
residents were anxious about the maldistribution of aid and expressed concerns that 
resources were channeled to those related to, or politically affiliated with, the 
barangay captain. ‘Expectations of reward or punishment’ relate to not only the goods 
and services that aid agencies deliver but also how barangay captains control the flow 
of these resources.  This issue is of primary importance to those seeking to gather 
‘good’ data at the local level. The practical logistics of family interviews and the data 
gathering process are elaborated on in the next section.    
 
Rapport Building and Interview By Conversation 
 
Finding household respondents may be relatively easy. The real challenge for 
interviewers is to encourage respondents to reply openly and honestly with an 
adequate focus on the question. Anonymity and ensuring that the project and the 
researcher have no local political agenda is essential to ensure trust.  Our political 
neutrality was aided by our explanations of the project to the barangay captains and 
our use of official academic project identification cards for researchers. Respondents 																																																								31	Barangay	name	removed	to	ensure	confidentiality.		32	This reluctance to be critical was also seen in the responses of some of the barangay captains who 
were sometimes wary of commenting on their respective mayors on tape.	Many	 barangay	 captains	talked	 fondly	 of	 their	mayors,	 however	 they	were	 only	 candid	 about	 vote	 buying	 in	 the	 2016	mayoral	(and	regional	and	national)	elections	once	the	tape	had	been	switched	off.		
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were also told that if they were uncomfortable with a question or were not confident 
with an answer then they could just indicate that they wanted to move on to the next 
question.   
 
We found that, in practice, the semi-structured interviews became interviews by 
conversation, as respondents were also interested in the interviewer. Interviews are in 
effect ordered conversations but apart from the semi-structured element of the 
engagement ‘the interview responds to precisely the same kinds of opportunities and 
constraints as “ordinary” conversation’33 in that communication is a two way process. 
The conversation element of the interviews was evident in interviews with the 
householders and the barangay captains. Often the interviewer was asked about their 
families, religion, careers, origins and overall purpose of the project. The 
conversational element of the interview is useful as it can help the respondent feel at 
ease, and therefore more talkative, and on a par with the interviewer.  
 
Camaraderie was built with some of the barangay captains by the time of the second 
year of interviews and it was relatively common to stay and talk informally after the 
tape was switched off. We took merienda (snacks) for the barangay captains and often 
we were offered food by way of hospitality in return. These social processes helped to 
build trust amongst the interviewee and the interviewer. It was also important that the 
project was properly explained to everyone that asked otherwise there is the danger 
that people will resent that fact that their experience, knowledge and even images are 
expropriated without any discernible benefit to themselves.            
 
The very presence of strangers in the barangays draws attention. Filipinos are social, 
curious and hospitable. Residents were happy to give directions, even accompanying 
researchers to the houses of interviewees. We were asked about our intentions in the 
barangay, the agency that we represented and why we were only interviewing two 
households in the barangay. Even in the middle of interviews, inevitably some 
passersby approached and asked questions about the interview. It was common for 
interviewees to welcome friends and neighbors into the house whilst the interview 
																																																								
33 Blommaert, Jan and Dong, Jie, 2010, Ethnographic Fieldwork: A Beginners Guide, Multilingual 
Matters: Bristol, p. 44. 
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was taking place. This meant that the interview turned into a group process. In the 
Philippines this is an entirely normal process and should be expected.  
 
During such unintentionally ‘communal’ interviews additional attendees sometimes 
interrupted if the householder was slow to answer a question or could not remember. 
This meant that the eventual response of the householder was conditioned by the 
response already given. It also meant that the opportunity for ‘silent probes’ was lost. 
Allowing for silence in interviews is an important way of prompting a response. 
Interviewers should not rush to fill silence or finish sentences, however the vocal 
extra attendees disrupted the silence. Interviewees also got cut off during the 
interview if their friends found their responses to be incorrect or in need of 
elaboration.  Some interviewees were also happy to let their friends narrate some of 
their shared experiences during the typhoon especially if they stayed in the same 
evacuation area. It is impossible to know how the same interview would have played 
out without the presence of the friends. The communal aspect of the interview 
allowed the interviewer to further understand local dynamics within the community 
but the group situation undermined the anonymity of the interview and potentially 
made interviewees less critical of barangay captains and other residents.   
 
Ideally interviewers should conduct interviews in a distraction free location. However 
this was not always possible in the crowded barangays, houses are often small, very 
close together and near busy walkways. Houses might lack windows, only having 
holes that can be shuttered, so privacy is compromised. Multiple occupants and 
visitors might be present during the interview, including small children who require 
the attention of their parents. However the household is often the most convenient 
place for the interviewee to be available and the place in which he/she feels most at 
ease. It is unwise for the interviewer to eject friends and neighbours if the householder 
has invited them into the house as this could be seen as rude.    
 
Tokens 
 
Tokens can play a significant role in easing the process of the interviews. Each 
household respondent was given a food pack of noodles and some tinned goods in 
recognition of their contribution to the project and as an incentive to take part. It is 
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usual, and was the experience post Yolanda, for donors to conduct surveys and 
interviews before giving aid to typhoon victims. Therefore ‘a culture of expectation’34 
was already established which meant that people automatically expected aid or reward 
from anyone conducting interviews in the barangays. This can result in an eagerness 
to be interviewed and an emphasis on indigence linked to the expectation of reward or 
punishment. It is therefore important that academic researchers conducting surveys 
and interviews emphasize that the work is academic and not related to a funding 
agency.  
 
In practical terms our researchers did not visibly carry tokens in order to avoid 
attracting respondents that were not needed. We also made a deliberate decision not to 
give out cash incentives. This was because we did not want our interviewers to be 
known to be carrying relatively large sums of money around and we wanted to avoid 
funding expenditure on ‘negative’ commodities such as alcohol or cigarettes. 
Nevertheless some residents did volunteer to become respondents when they realized 
that the interviewers were giving out tokens to households that were interviewed. In 
some cases the unintentionally communal interviews outlined above created a 
problem as the uninvited interviewees also expected a token. When planning 
fieldwork and research projects it is advisable to factor in the cost of tokens, the 
difficulty of transporting larger items such as canned goods (perishable goods should 
be avoided) and the need to strike a balance between accounting for extra tokens that 
might be needed whilst keeping within the project budget. In practice we found that it 
was sometimes hard to control the number of attendees at interviews and focus 
groups.  
 
Inconsistency in responses 
 
During the conduct of family interviews, the interviewers noticed several 
contradictions and inconsistencies in the answers given by the respondents. These 
were not only apparent among those living in the same areas, but also even within the 
same interview with the same respondent. For instance:  
 																																																								34	Head,	Emma,	2009,	‘The	ethics	and	implications	of	paying	participants	in	qualitative	research’,	
International	Journal	of	Social	Research	Methodology,	Vol.	12,	No.	4,	pps	335-344,	p.	343.	
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• A broad question of whether the community has improved met with a 
response that ‘the community is still the same’. However, in the same 
interview, a related question regarding the status of community participation 
and cohesion, met with the response that ‘the community has improved and 
people were helpful to one another’. The second answer gave credit to Tzu 
Chi’s cash for work program35 as a driver of community building. Other 
interviewees corroborated this view36.  
• An interviewee was asked whether there is an improvement in their family’s 
situation and answered that there was ‘none at all’. But when asked to 
compare their situation before and after Yolanda, the respondent answered that 
‘life is better now’. The latter answer was linked to an additional source of 
income from a new ‘sari-sari’ store.  
• A respondent stated that barangay officials tampered with master lists that 
were used to assign aid to beneficiaries. However when asked what would he 
have done differently, if he were in the position of personnel or agencies 
giving out aid, he answered ‘nothing’. Even though he was aware of 
anomalies in the lists.  
 
Inconsistency in responses was also noted in other interviews and focus group 
discussions. There are several evidence-based reasons for these inconsistencies. 
Firstly many people in a post-disaster environment perceive that any stranger entering 
their community is there to distribute aid. This means that when interviewees are 
asked about their situation their initial response is likely to indicate that it is ‘not 
improved’ or ‘still the same’ as they anticipate reward or punishment for their answer. 
However their negative response is then contradicted when they expand upon the 
actual detail of the situation. Secondly some respondents were reluctant in answering 
questions concerning the barangay officials especially about the barangay captains 
because they are afraid that these officials will be privy to the interviews. This meant 
that whilst problems with the lists were raised this was also dismissed as ‘inevitable’. 																																																								35	n.	a.,	2013,	‘One	month	after	Yolanda:	Cleaner	Streets,	hopeful	lives’,	Taiwan	Buddhist	Tzu	Chi		Foundation.	Available	 at:	 http://tzuchi.org.ph/special_report/one-month-after-yolanda-cleaner-streets-hopeful-lives-2/.	Accessed	8	February	2017.		36	The	 psychosocial	 benefits	 of	 cash	 for	 work	 have	 also	 been	 noted	 in	 other	 post	 disaster	situations.	 See	 e.g.	 Doocy,	 Shannon	 et.	 al.,	 ‘Implementing	 Cash	 for	Work	 Programmes	 in	 post-tsunami	Aceh:	experiences	and	lessons	learned’	Disasters,	Vol.	30,	No.3.,	pps.	277-	296.			
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Thirdly, friends and neighbours, who shared the same experience of disaster, might 
contradict each other over where disaster relief came from.  This is because multiple 
agencies worked within the same areas and answers were based on individual 
personal experiences and these experiences were not identical.  
 
We suggest that inconsistency in response might be managed in the following ways. 
Firstly probing questions can play a useful role in drawing out accurate information. 
Sometimes respondents get tired of answering questions and so when asked 
something general that needs extensive thinking, they tend to opt for a limited 
response or no answer at all. In order to limit this we specifically avoided asking 
questions that were likely to result in a simple ‘yes or no’ response. However if a 
limited response is offered probing questions can help to jog memory and focus 
responses on the specifics of an issue. The step-by-step nature of some probing 
questions can help researchers to gather more information. Probing questions can be 
factored into the prepared list of questions but they can also be generated 
spontaneously by the unstructured flow of interview by conversation. Secondly 
inconsistency in responses should not be dismissed as lies or confusion. People 
inevitably construct, reconstruct and embellish their own memories and narratives of 
events and the specific of these narratives may differ over time and between people 
who have undergone the same experience. The inconsistent responses should be 
recorded and crosschecked against other primary and secondary information in order 
to generate a fuller picture of events. This process of cross-checking is equally 
important for aid agencies. We found that, in practice, some aid agencies cross-
checked information from beneficiaries with barangays captains and municipal and 
city hall records, but some did not.    
 
Conclusion 
 
‘Natural’ disasters on the scale of Typhon Yolanda can have a material and social 
impact akin to that of a major war. Governmental and non-governmental aid agencies 
face significant challenges in meeting short-term basic needs and devising 
rehabilitation solutions that will help communities regenerate and become resilient 
over the longer term. Sometimes ‘natural’ disasters are part and parcel of complex 
emergencies characterized by political instability, ethnic conflict and other forms of 
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violence. This was not the case after Typhoon Yolanda, nevertheless tensions between 
local and national government offices, social inequality and underlying poverty 
created a number of challenges. Governmental and non-governmental agencies have a 
duty to serve disaster struck communities, make the most of available resources, and 
satisfy donors and tax payers that their money is not being wasted. It is incumbent 
upon agencies to devise contextually relevant and sustainable solutions. It is therefore 
essential to involve beneficiaries and local stakeholders in the design and delivery of 
recovery and rehabilitation initiatives. It is important to take account of local socio-
cultural beliefs and practices during the rebuilding process. It is also essential to take 
account of power configurations, as constructions of both custom and legislation, 
within families, communities and local government.  
 
Rebuilding is not just about the provision of material goods. It is also about social 
need, adaptation and the reconstruction of resilient communities. This means that 
recovery programs must incorporate the views and assessment of the survivors 
themselves. However self-rated need, especially in post-disaster situations, is liable to 
be distorted by the anticipation of reward or punishment. This poses a number of 
challenges for academics and practitioners aiming to gather robust data in post 
disaster environments. This leads us to the following conclusions.     
 
Household interviews can result in a wealth of information. However power holders 
within local situations, in this case the barangay captains, can potentially censure or 
distort the data gathering process by guiding researchers towards trusted associates 
and even family members. For this reason it is essential to interview a sample of the 
population large enough to allow for the cross checking of responses. In our case our 
two family interviews per barangay (40 in total annually) were complemented with 40 
surveys per barangay (800 in total annually), interviews with a range of governmental 
and non-governmental officials. These interviews were conducted on a repeat basis 
over three years. Primary data was crosschecked against other available primary and 
secondary data, including data from the city and municipal halls in the three LGUs 
under research. Household interviews are useful to get a deep understanding of 
peoples’ experiences and situation. However the information gathered has to be dealt 
with as systematically as possible before validity can be claimed. It is not enough for 
researchers to visit communities and take reported problems at face value. 
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It is helpful to research the specific experience of particular cases before conducting 
fieldwork. We researched the situation in the chosen barangays prior to field research 
in order to familiarize ourselves with the political context and specific experience of 
Yolanda within that barangay. Over 6000 people died during and shortly after 
Typhoon Yolanda so it was important that we approached our task with a certain 
degree of sensitivity. The coastal barangays that we chose were ‘most similar’ but 
their experience was not identical. The chosen barangays had already featured in the 
national and international news. It was important to be aware of these stories as it 
helped contextualize the first hand accounts that we heard.   
 
Potentially aid agencies that have personnel already working in communities before a 
disaster have an advantage as they are trusted and have an intimate knowledge of 
local practices and behaviour and the political set-up. This is not always possible but 
certainly we observed many instances of international NGOs hiring local workers 
who already had local experience in particular fields such as health and livelihood. 
International NGOs also set up partnerships with local community based 
organizations (CBOs). Whilst local hiring and partnerships are generally to be 
commended often projects were only temporary. In some cases this led to claims that 
initiatives were ‘orphaned’ by their international sponsors.      
 
Researchers and aid agencies face limitations in terms of time, money and pressure to 
produce results. Ultimately aid agencies may give in to the temptation to give the type 
of aid that they want to or have available as opposed to listening to the locals and 
cross checking reported need with the local authorities. If the locals are telling a 
confused or inconsistent story, this temptation is likely to get stronger. The end result 
could be wasted resources and unsustainable strategies that contribute towards 
continuing vulnerability in disaster prone and/or impoverished communities. 
 
A working knowledge of pre-disaster political alliances is important, as these 
alliances tend to shape or influence the distribution of relief goods and services and 
rehabilitation efforts. After Typhoon Yolanda aid agencies had to navigate power 
configurations within barangays in order to identify qualified beneficiaries. However 
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this process was widely critiqued as being politically driven37. Donors should 
therefore enforce transparency in the listing of recipients and undertake counterchecks 
to improve veracity. Academic researchers must be mindful of the post-disaster 
political context. Debts of gratitude or resentment against the barangay captains can 
colour the self-assessment of survivor experiences and need. The political setting of 
the locale can distort the responses of interviewees who are guided by their 
relationship to their  ‘patrons’. Patrons might be local political families including 
barangay captains and their relatives.   
 
Top-down and bottom-up driven disaster relief strategies can both be politicized and 
subjective. Bottom-up strategies may suffer from skewed self-assessments of need 
however they are valuable in that they can illuminate the social as well as material 
context of post disaster environments. The specific concerns of community members 
can be addressed because the information comes directly from them. However, as 
presented in this paper, self-assessment of needs in a post-disaster context can be 
problematic. The anticipation of reward or punishment can skew answers.  
 
However rather than abandon self-assessment it is incumbent on researchers to adapt 
their practices to account for such distortions by tailoring the format and conduct of 
their interviews to best reveal reliable responses that inform ‘good data’. Anonymity 
is essential to the interview process. If interview questions are not crafted in the local 
language it is essential to have them translated. It is also useful for interviewers to be 
fluent in the local language. Questions should be focused but also allow for further 
‘probe’ queries that allow for in-depth answers. Interviewees should be flexible 
enough to accommodate an ‘uninvited’ audience to the proceedings whilst also 
keeping control of the situation. Interviewers should also be objective, whilst general 
sympathetic overtones can build affinity with interviewees, moral judgment on 
reported behaviour in the barangays does not help the research process. The resulting 
data should also be subject to a systematic process of crosschecking with other 
available resources. Trust should be build with interviewees and anonymity must be 
																																																								37	This	 was	 also	 the	 case	 at	 the	 national	 and	 LGU	 level.	 Patronage	 and	 debts	 of	 gratitude	 or	resentment	extend	 to	 local	mayors	and	 regional	 and	national	political	personalities.	Barangays	are	not	self-contained	political	units,	they	nest	within	a	hierarchy	of	jurisdictions	across	which	a	network	of	political	loyalties	operate.				
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guaranteed. It should also be clear to respondents that academic researchers have no 
control over the allocation of aid.   
 
  
  
  
  
 
   
 
  
 
 
 
 	
 
 
  
  
 
